# -*- text -*- ## ## eap.conf -- Configuration for EAP types (PEAP, TTLS, etc.) ## ## $Id$ ####################################################################### # # Whatever you do, do NOT set 'Auth-Type := EAP'. The server # is smart enough to figure this out on its own. The most # common side effect of setting 'Auth-Type := EAP' is that the # users then cannot use ANY other authentication method. # # EAP types NOT listed here may be supported via the "eap2" module. # See experimental.conf for documentation. # eap { Auth-Type = EAP # Invoke the default supported EAP type when # EAP-Identity response is received. # # The incoming EAP messages DO NOT specify which EAP # type they will be using, so it MUST be set here. # # For now, only one default EAP type may be used at a time. # # If the EAP-Type attribute is set by another module, # then that EAP type takes precedence over the # default type configured here. # default_eap_type = md5 # A list is maintained to correlate EAP-Response # packets with EAP-Request packets. After a # configurable length of time, entries in the list # expire, and are deleted. # timer_expire = 60 # There are many EAP types, but the server has support # for only a limited subset. If the server receives # a request for an EAP type it does not support, then # it normally rejects the request. By setting this # configuration to "yes", you can tell the server to # instead keep processing the request. Another module # MUST then be configured to proxy the request to # another RADIUS server which supports that EAP type. # # If another module is NOT configured to handle the # request, then the request will still end up being # rejected. ignore_unknown_eap_types = yes # Cisco AP1230B firmware 12.2(13)JA1 has a bug. When given # a User-Name attribute in an Access-Accept, it copies one # more byte than it should. # # We can work around it by configurably adding an extra # zero byte. cisco_accounting_username_bug = no # # Help prevent DoS attacks by limiting the number of # sessions that the server is tracking. Most systems # can handle ~30 EAP sessions/s, so the default limit # of 4096 should be OK. max_sessions = 4096 # Supported EAP-types # # We do NOT recommend using EAP-MD5 authentication # for wireless connections. It is insecure, and does # not provide for dynamic WEP keys. # md5 { } # Cisco LEAP # # We do not recommend using LEAP in new deployments. See: # http://www.securiteam.com/tools/5TP012ACKE.html # # Cisco LEAP uses the MS-CHAP algorithm (but not # the MS-CHAP attributes) to perform it's authentication. # # As a result, LEAP *requires* access to the plain-text # User-Password, or the NT-Password attributes. # 'System' authentication is impossible with LEAP. # leap { } # Generic Token Card. # # Currently, this is only permitted inside of EAP-TTLS, # or EAP-PEAP. The module "challenges" the user with # text, and the response from the user is taken to be # the User-Password. # # Proxying the tunneled EAP-GTC session is a bad idea, # the users password will go over the wire in plain-text, # for anyone to see. # gtc { # The default challenge, which many clients # ignore.. #challenge = "Password: " # The plain-text response which comes back # is put into a User-Password attribute, # and passed to another module for # authentication. This allows the EAP-GTC # response to be checked against plain-text, # or crypt'd passwords. # # If you say "Local" instead of "PAP", then # the module will look for a User-Password # configured for the request, and do the # authentication itself. # auth_type = PAP } ## EAP-TLS # # See raddb/certs/README for additional comments # on certificates. # # If OpenSSL was not found at the time the server was # built, the "tls", "ttls", and "peap" sections will # be ignored. # # Otherwise, when the server first starts in debugging # mode, test certificates will be created. See the # "make_cert_command" below for details, and the README # file in raddb/certs # # These test certificates SHOULD NOT be used in a normal # deployment. They are created only to make it easier # to install the server, and to perform some simple # tests with EAP-TLS, TTLS, or PEAP. # # See also: # # http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,9286052~mode=flat # # Note that you should NOT use a globally known CA here! # e.g. using a Verisign cert as a "known CA" means that # ANYONE who has a certificate signed by them can # authenticate via EAP-TLS! This is likey not what you want. tls { # # These is used to simplify later configurations. # certdir = ${confdir}/certs cadir = ${confdir}/certs private_key_password = whatever private_key_file = ${certdir}/server.pem # If Private key & Certificate are located in # the same file, then private_key_file & # certificate_file must contain the same file # name. # # If CA_file (below) is not used, then the # certificate_file below MUST include not # only the server certificate, but ALSO all # of the CA certificates used to sign the # server certificate. certificate_file = ${certdir}/server.pem # Trusted Root CA list # # ALL of the CA's in this list will be trusted # to issue client certificates for authentication. # # In general, you should use self-signed # certificates for 802.1x (EAP) authentication. # In that case, this CA file should contain # *one* CA certificate. # # This parameter is used only for EAP-TLS, # when you issue client certificates. If you do # not use client certificates, and you do not want # to permit EAP-TLS authentication, then delete # this configuration item. CA_file = ${cadir}/ca.pem # # For DH cipher suites to work, you have to # run OpenSSL to create the DH file first: # # openssl dhparam -out certs/dh 1024 # dh_file = ${certdir}/dh random_file = ${certdir}/random # # This can never exceed the size of a RADIUS # packet (4096 bytes), and is preferably half # that, to accomodate other attributes in # RADIUS packet. On most APs the MAX packet # length is configured between 1500 - 1600 # In these cases, fragment size should be # 1024 or less. # # fragment_size = 1024 # include_length is a flag which is # by default set to yes If set to # yes, Total Length of the message is # included in EVERY packet we send. # If set to no, Total Length of the # message is included ONLY in the # First packet of a fragment series. # # include_length = yes # Check the Certificate Revocation List # # 1) Copy CA certificates and CRLs to same directory. # 2) Execute 'c_rehash '. # 'c_rehash' is OpenSSL's command. # 3) uncomment the line below. # 5) Restart radiusd # check_crl = yes CA_path = ${cadir} # # If check_cert_issuer is set, the value will # be checked against the DN of the issuer in # the client certificate. If the values do not # match, the cerficate verification will fail, # rejecting the user. # # In 2.1.10 and later, this check can be done # more generally by checking the value of the # TLS-Client-Cert-Issuer attribute. This check # can be done via any mechanism you choose. # # check_cert_issuer = "/C=GB/ST=Berkshire/L=Newbury/O=My Company Ltd" # # If check_cert_cn is set, the value will # be xlat'ed and checked against the CN # in the client certificate. If the values # do not match, the certificate verification # will fail rejecting the user. # # This check is done only if the previous # "check_cert_issuer" is not set, or if # the check succeeds. # # In 2.1.10 and later, this check can be done # more generally by checking the value of the # TLS-Client-Cert-CN attribute. This check # can be done via any mechanism you choose. # # check_cert_cn = %{User-Name} # # Set this option to specify the allowed # TLS cipher suites. The format is listed # in "man 1 ciphers". cipher_list = "DEFAULT" # # This configuration entry should be deleted # once the server is running in a normal # configuration. It is here ONLY to make # initial deployments easier. # make_cert_command = "${certdir}/bootstrap" # # Session resumption / fast reauthentication # cache. # # The cache contains the following information: # # session Id - unique identifier, managed by SSL # User-Name - from the Access-Accept # Stripped-User-Name - from the Access-Request # Cached-Session-Policy - from the Access-Accept # # The "Cached-Session-Policy" is the name of a # policy which should be applied to the cached # session. This policy can be used to assign # VLANs, IP addresses, etc. It serves as a useful # way to re-apply the policy from the original # Access-Accept to the subsequent Access-Accept # for the cached session. # # On session resumption, these attributes are # copied from the cache, and placed into the # reply list. # # You probably also want "use_tunneled_reply = yes" # when using fast session resumption. # cache { # # Enable it. The default is "no". # Deleting the entire "cache" subsection # Also disables caching. # # You can disallow resumption for a # particular user by adding the following # attribute to the control item list: # # Allow-Session-Resumption = No # # If "enable = no" below, you CANNOT # enable resumption for just one user # by setting the above attribute to "yes". # enable = no # # Lifetime of the cached entries, in hours. # The sessions will be deleted after this # time. # lifetime = 24 # hours # # The maximum number of entries in the # cache. Set to "0" for "infinite". # # This could be set to the number of users # who are logged in... which can be a LOT. # max_entries = 255 } # # As of version 2.1.10, client certificates can be # validated via an external command. This allows # dynamic CRLs or OCSP to be used. # # This configuration is commented out in the # default configuration. Uncomment it, and configure # the correct paths below to enable it. # verify { # A temporary directory where the client # certificates are stored. This directory # MUST be owned by the UID of the server, # and MUST not be accessible by any other # users. When the server starts, it will do # "chmod go-rwx" on the directory, for # security reasons. The directory MUST # exist when the server starts. # # You should also delete all of the files # in the directory when the server starts. # tmpdir = /tmp/radiusd # The command used to verify the client cert. # We recommend using the OpenSSL command-line # tool. # # The ${..CA_path} text is a reference to # the CA_path variable defined above. # # The %{TLS-Client-Cert-Filename} is the name # of the temporary file containing the cert # in PEM format. This file is automatically # deleted by the server when the command # returns. # client = "/path/to/openssl verify -CApath ${..CA_path} %{TLS-Client-Cert-Filename}" } } # The TTLS module implements the EAP-TTLS protocol, # which can be described as EAP inside of Diameter, # inside of TLS, inside of EAP, inside of RADIUS... # # Surprisingly, it works quite well. # # The TTLS module needs the TLS module to be installed # and configured, in order to use the TLS tunnel # inside of the EAP packet. You will still need to # configure the TLS module, even if you do not want # to deploy EAP-TLS in your network. Users will not # be able to request EAP-TLS, as it requires them to # have a client certificate. EAP-TTLS does not # require a client certificate. # # You can make TTLS require a client cert by setting # # EAP-TLS-Require-Client-Cert = Yes # # in the control items for a request. # ttls { username_identity_check="NO" # The tunneled EAP session needs a default # EAP type which is separate from the one for # the non-tunneled EAP module. Inside of the # TTLS tunnel, we recommend using EAP-MD5. # If the request does not contain an EAP # conversation, then this configuration entry # is ignored. default_eap_type = md5 # The tunneled authentication request does # not usually contain useful attributes # like 'Calling-Station-Id', etc. These # attributes are outside of the tunnel, # and normally unavailable to the tunneled # authentication request. # # By setting this configuration entry to # 'yes', any attribute which NOT in the # tunneled authentication request, but # which IS available outside of the tunnel, # is copied to the tunneled request. # # allowed values: {no, yes} copy_request_to_tunnel = no # The reply attributes sent to the NAS are # usually based on the name of the user # 'outside' of the tunnel (usually # 'anonymous'). If you want to send the # reply attributes based on the user name # inside of the tunnel, then set this # configuration entry to 'yes', and the reply # to the NAS will be taken from the reply to # the tunneled request. # # allowed values: {no, yes} use_tunneled_reply = no # # The inner tunneled request can be sent # through a virtual server constructed # specifically for this purpose. # # If this entry is commented out, the inner # tunneled request will be sent through # the virtual server that processed the # outer requests. # virtual_server = "inner-tunnel" # This has the same meaning as the # same field in the "tls" module, above. # The default value here is "yes". # include_length = yes } ################################################## # # !!!!! WARNINGS for Windows compatibility !!!!! # ################################################## # # If you see the server send an Access-Challenge, # and the client never sends another Access-Request, # then # # STOP! # # The server certificate has to have special OID's # in it, or else the Microsoft clients will silently # fail. See the "scripts/xpextensions" file for # details, and the following page: # # http://support.microsoft.com/kb/814394/en-us # # For additional Windows XP SP2 issues, see: # # http://support.microsoft.com/kb/885453/en-us # # # If is still doesn't work, and you're using Samba, # you may be encountering a Samba bug. See: # # https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6563 # # Note that we do not necessarily agree with their # explanation... but the fix does appear to work. # ################################################## # # The tunneled EAP session needs a default EAP type # which is separate from the one for the non-tunneled # EAP module. Inside of the TLS/PEAP tunnel, we # recommend using EAP-MS-CHAPv2. # # The PEAP module needs the TLS module to be installed # and configured, in order to use the TLS tunnel # inside of the EAP packet. You will still need to # configure the TLS module, even if you do not want # to deploy EAP-TLS in your network. Users will not # be able to request EAP-TLS, as it requires them to # have a client certificate. EAP-PEAP does not # require a client certificate. # # # You can make PEAP require a client cert by setting # # EAP-TLS-Require-Client-Cert = Yes # # in the control items for a request. # peap { # The tunneled EAP session needs a default # EAP type which is separate from the one for # the non-tunneled EAP module. Inside of the # PEAP tunnel, we recommend using MS-CHAPv2, # as that is the default type supported by # Windows clients. default_eap_type = mschapv2 # the PEAP module also has these configuration # items, which are the same as for TTLS. copy_request_to_tunnel = no use_tunneled_reply = no # When the tunneled session is proxied, the # home server may not understand EAP-MSCHAP-V2. # Set this entry to "no" to proxy the tunneled # EAP-MSCHAP-V2 as normal MSCHAPv2. # proxy_tunneled_request_as_eap = yes # # The inner tunneled request can be sent # through a virtual server constructed # specifically for this purpose. # # If this entry is commented out, the inner # tunneled request will be sent through # the virtual server that processed the # outer requests. # virtual_server = "inner-tunnel" } # # This takes no configuration. # # Note that it is the EAP MS-CHAPv2 sub-module, not # the main 'mschap' module. # # Note also that in order for this sub-module to work, # the main 'mschap' module MUST ALSO be configured. # # This module is the *Microsoft* implementation of MS-CHAPv2 # in EAP. There is another (incompatible) implementation # of MS-CHAPv2 in EAP by Cisco, which FreeRADIUS does not # currently support. # mschapv2 { } }